



The major goal of this paper is to show how relevance theory (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986, 1987, 2002, 2005; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004) explains 
the process involved in disambiguation as it is performed by comprehenders 
processing discourse in overt intentional communicative situations. 
Relevance Theory: Basic Assumptions and Claims
Relevance theory as originally formulated by Sperber and Wilson (1986) and 
later elaborated on and refined by the originators (Sperber 1994; Sperber and 
Wilson 1987, 1997, 2002, 2005; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004; Wilson 1999, 
2005, 2006) and other researchers working within this psycholinguistic model 
(cf., for instance, Carston 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006; Zegarac 2006), assumes that 
human cognition is geared towards relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 47). 
This means that performing different mental operations which have to do with 
directing attention at certain events, processing incoming stimuli, representing 
mentally the information that is available as input is believed to be affected 
by the search for relevance. 
Orientation towards stimuli, phenomena or inputs that are potentially rel­
evant and processing them in the way that will maximize their relevance is 
postulated to be an essential biologically rooted ability that underlies hu­
man cognitive functioning (cf. Yus 2005: 512). This mechanism is assumed 
to have developed in the course of phylogenesis and may be related to the 
species instinct for self-preservation (Sperber 1994). As Wilson and Sperber 
(2004: 610) argue, 
As a result of constant selection pressures toward increasing efficiency, the human 
cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms 
tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval 
mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our 
inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive 
way. 
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If conceptual processes are relevance-driven and if processing of incoming 
information is geared towards maximizing relevance, it seems logical to assume 
that a cognitive principle of economy will be at work (Sperber and Wilson 1986; 
Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). This axiom is formalized within the relevance- 
theoretic framework as the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, in accordance with 
which “human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance” 
(Wilson and Sperber 2004: 610). 
Utterance Comprehension - The Relevance Theoretic Model
The Cognitive Principle of Relevance is the cornerstone of the model of commu­
nication that Sperber and Wilson have developed. Granted that human cognition 
is oriented towards relevance, since in intentional verbal communication the 
communicator demands the addressee’s attention, it is only to be expected that 
what is being communicated should come with some kind of guarantee that it 
is relevant. In other words, it is postulated on this model that by claiming the 
audience’s attention in overt intentional communication, the speaker creates 
expectations that what she is saying will be relevant to the hearer. In overt 
intentional communication then, which is called ostensive communication by 
Sperber and Wilson ( 1986: 49), the very act of claiming the addressee’s attention 
has to do with raising expectations of relevance. 
This claim is formalized in relevance theory as the Communicative Prin­
ciple of Relevance. The Communicative Principle of Relevance states that 
“every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its optimal relevance” 
(Wilson and Sperber 2004: 612). The presumption of optimal relevance entitles 
the audience (a) to treat a given ostensive stimulus (produced by the commu­
nicator) as relevant enough to be worth processing, and (b) to approach it as 
the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and pref­
erences (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 612). This means that on this model it is 
postulated that when processing verbal stimuli the interpreter tacitly assumes 
that what is communicated is at least worth his attention and should be treated 
as the most relevant stimulus that the speaker is willing and able to produce 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 270-271). While clause (a) of the presumption of 
optimal relevance predicts that, by definition, verbal stimuli come with a guar­
antee that the speaker will say something which - in her estimation - is worth 
the addressee’s while, clause (b) ensures that the hearer necessarily treats the 
utterance as the most relevant one that the speaker is able to produce. This pa­
rameter spells out certain expectations that constrain the interpretation process 
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and indicates what speakers should anticipate about the hearer’s processing of 
the incoming ostensive stimulus. 
The presumption of optimal relevance is the backbone of the interpre- 
tational heuristics that is offered on the relevance-theoretic approach. This 
heuristics is a practical procedure that interpreters are believed to adhere to 
in recovering the speaker’s meaning. The relevance-oriented comprehension 
heuristics instructs the interpreter to “(a) to follow a path of least effort in 
constructing an interpretation of the utterance (and in particular in resolving 
ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, in going beyond linguistic mean­
ing, in supplying contextual assumptions, computing implicatures, etc. ) in order 
of accessibility, and (b) to stop when [the interpreter’s] expectations of rele­
vance are satisfied” (or abandoned) (Sperber and Wilson 2005: 360). It is 
posited then that formulating the hypothesis about what a particular utterance 
means, the hearer takes the easiest route to be followed and treats the fist in­
terpretation that allows him to recover adequate cognitive effects as the one 
actually targeted by the speaker. This heuristics explains how and why an ut­
terance will have a certain contextual interpretation to the exclusion of other 
interpretations it might potentially give rise to (Zegarac 2006: 1703): the first 
accessible interpretive hypothesis that the comprehender finds relevant enough 
is supposed to surface as the meaning actually intended by the communicator 
in a given discourse situation. 
Participants in communicative exchanges are viewed on this approach as 
information-processing devices. It is claimed that in oral discourse, by produc­
ing an utterance the speaker modifies the cognitive environment of the hearer 
in order to achieve an intended effect. Like a number of other researchers 
working in the field of pragmatics, Sperber and Wilson maintain that mean­
ings that are communicated verbally, are not merely decoded, but need to be 
inferred from what is said. This premise follows from the fact that what is said 
severely underdetermines what is conveyed (cf., among others, Bach 2004; 
Bezuidenhout 1997; Carston 2002, 2004, 2006; Mason 2006; Sperber and Wil­
son 1997, 2002, 2005, 2006; Wilson 2006; Pagin and Pelletier 2007; Vicente 
and Martinez-Manrique 2005; Zegarac 2006). 
The basic assumption is that what the communicator needs to do in order 
to communicate a certain meaning amounts to providing sufficient evidence for 
the addressee to recover the intended meaning. In nonverbal communication, an 
ostensive gesture may be enough to convey the intended meaning, e. g. pointing 
to the leash hanging near the door may be enough to inform the addressee 
that the communicator intends to take the dog for a walk, provided that the 
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addressee can be expected to formulate this hypothesis on the basis of the 
intentions made manifest by this communicative act. Thus as long as it can be 
confidently predicted that the audience will access the intended interpretation 
of a certain ostensive gesture in a given situation, the intended meaning can be 
conveyed simply by producing this gesture even if it is not part of any code 
or social convention (cf. Carston 2006: 61). 
In verbal communication, a piece of evidence from which the speaker 
meaning is to be inferred comes in the form of an utterance, which encodes 
linguistic meaning. The linguistic form that is decoded in utterance processing 
is assumed to become the input to the relevance-driven inferential process that 
the hearer engages in (cf. Carston 2006). 
As it has been indicated earlier, the hearer is assumed to accept the decoded 
verbal signal addressed at him as a piece of evidence from which he needs to 
infer the intended meaning. On this approach, utterances are believed to “encode 
logical forms (conceptual representations, however fragmentary or incomplete) 
... [which provide] an important clue to the speaker’s intentions” (Wilson and 
Sperber 2004: 614-15). The hearer is supposed to work on the assumption that 
what has been said is the most relevant stimulus that the communicator was 
able and willing to produce. Looking for the interpretation that satisfies the 
presumption of relevance, the hearer engages in a non-demonstrative inference 
process, constructing interpretive hypotheses about the meaning conveyed. 
In order to recover the speaker meaning, the hearer (or reader, as the case 
may be) needs to perform a series of inferential subtasks. These are postulated 
by Wilson and Sperber (2004: 615) to embrace: 
1) Constructing an adequate hypothesis about the explicit content (EXPLICA- 
TURES) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other prag­
matic enrichment processes. 
2) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assump­
tions (IMPLICATED PREMISES). 
3) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual impli­
cations (IMPLICATED CONCLUSIONS). 
At the level of explicit import then, explicatures are formed. An explica- 
ture is defined as “an ostensively communicated assumption which is inferen- 
tially developed from one of the incomplete conceptual representations (logical 
forms) encoded by the utterance” (Carston 2002: 377), and strictly speaking, 
has to do with what is in fact said. Explicatures result from the development 
of linguistically encoded meaning to full propositionality (Ariel 2002: 1005), 
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and are “an amalgam of decoded linguistic meaning and pragmatically inferred 
meaning” (Carston 2004: 636). 
As the definition presented above indicates, implicatures recovered in the 
course of utterance comprehension can either be implicated premises or im­
plicated conclusions. Assumptions accessed as context in which the incoming 
information is to be processed are identified as implicated premises, whereas 
inferences derived from the contextual implications combined with the explicit 
content of the utterance form implicated conclusions. 
The subtasks that have been just described should not be thought of as 
performed in a linear sequence. Utterance comprehension, as the originators 
of relevance theory emphasize, is an on-line, automatic, instantaneous pro­
cess, and “hypotheses about explicatures, implicated premises and implicated 
conclusions are developed in parallel against the background of expectations 
which may be revised or elaborated as the utterance unfolds” (Wilson and 
Sperber 2004: 615). This suggests that there is a constant mutual adjustment of 
explicit and implicit content during the interpretation process, with all “inferen­
tial elaborations... performed automatically and unconsciously” (Sperber and 
Wilson 2005: 366) by a specialized dedicated inferential module responsible 
for verbal comprehension in the human mind (cf., among others, Sperber and 
Wilson 2002; Wilson 2005). 
Disambiguation and Relevance
How does the relevance theoretic model account for disambiguation processes? 
Like many linguists (e. g., Gibbon, this volume; Jucker et. al. 2003; Klepous- 
niotou 2002; Naess and Gullvag 1996; Nerlich and Clarke 2001; Rodd et al. 
2002) Sperber and Wilson regard ambiguity to be a pervasive phenomenon 
in ordinary language use. 
At this juncture, let us analyze an example. Consider (1): 
(1) I looked at the chest. 
In the absence of any context, (1) is ambiguous. As the entry for the noun 
chest in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2000, 4th 
ed., Houghton Mifflin Company) shows, there are several meanings that it 
can express: 
1.  The part of the body between the neck and the abdomen, enclosed by the ribs 
and the breastbone; the thorax. 
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2. a. A sturdy box with a lid and often a lock, used especially for storage. 
b. A small closet or cabinet with shelves for storing supplies
3. a. The treasury of a public institution. 
b. The funds kept there. 
4. a. A box for the shipping of certain goods, such as tea. 
b. The quantity packed in such a box. 
5. A sealed receptacle for liquid, gas, or steam. 
6. A bureau; a dresser. 
[Middle English, from Old English cest, box, from West Germanic *kista, from 
Latin cista, from Greek kiste. ]
The utterance in (1) is thus multiply ambiguous. As soon as context is supplied 
though, only one reading surfaces; in (la) this is the ‘box’ reading of the 
item in question: 
(1) (a)... I looked at the chest... “Pa says it must never be opened without Cousin 
Rachel’s permission, ” said Cecily. 
(from The Story Girl by Lucy Maud Montgomery 
<http: //digital. library. upenn. edu/women/montgomery/story/story. html>)
A different meaning will be assigned to the word chest if the co-text is like 
the one in (lb): 
(1) (b)... I looked at the chest and the arms and finally the face, and for the first time 
I was able to recognize the person looking back at me, for the first time I saw me. 
(from “Reflections of me” by Shamus Greenman, 
<http: //www. bmezine. com/news/edit/A40214/artrefle. html>)
Here is how the relevance theoretic approach accounts for this. It is pos­
tulated that understanding utterances involves both decoding and inference. 
The decoding process is assumed to be performed by an autonomous language 
perception module. Having identified a certain linguistic signal (acoustic or 
graphic), this system executes a series of grammatical computations, or map­
pings, resulting in an output representation, which is the logical form of the 
sentence or phrase being processed. It is a structured string of concepts, with 
logical and causal properties (cf. Carston 2002: 57). It is not-fully proposi­
tional, so it functions as a template from which a fully-fledged proposition will 
be developed through pragmatic inferencing that the comprehender needs to 
engage in. The words as decoded by the interpreter provide access to lexical, 
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logical and conceptual entries in the language user’s mind. While lexical entries 
store essential information about the linguistic properties of lexical items, and 
logical entries embrace logical semantic formulas for a given concept, the ency­
clopaedic entry affords access to information about the extension or denotation 
of the concept as encoded by a lexical item in the language. This information 
is assumed to be stored as a set of assumptions about the objects, events and/or 
properties that instantiate the decoded concept (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 87). 
Encyclopaedic entries typically vary across speakers and times, they are open- 
ended and subject to restructuring and modification, with partial access to the 
most useful ones stored under a certain concept brought to bear in utterance 
processing (cf. also Carston 2002, 2006; Sperber and Wilson 2006). 
Coming back to the examples under scrutiny, the decoding process and 
pragmatic inferences would yield the box=container interpretation for the word 
chest in the context ( 1 a). Why? The set of most relevant and immediately avail­
able assumptions brought to bear in the interpretation process, with the highly 
accessible ones about opening treasure chests, which often contain valuables, 
are responsible for this meaning surfacing in the context. Thus the co-text in 
(la), in which the verb phrase be opened appears, affords the interpreter im­
mediate access to the box=container interpretation, as the chest=box schema 
includes an assumption that chests can be used to store various kinds of (pre­
cious) objects. Switching the context (by changing the co-text) as in (lb) results 
in a different meaning assigned to the noun chest. So let us analyze (lb), re­
peated below for convenience:
(1) (b) ... 1 looked at the chest and the arms and finally the face, and for the first 
time I was able to recognize the person looking back at me, for the first time 
I saw me.
The co-text in (lb) gives the interpreter access to encyclopedic entries of 
different human body parts and the shortest, or in other words the most relevant 
processing of the lexical item chest, would be the body part reading.
Both these examples show how pragmatic enrichment necessarily con­
tributes to the recovery of what is said (not just to what is communicated). 
As Wilson emphases (2004: 354), understanding of what is meant is a matter 
of following a path of least effort in mutually adjusting explicit and implicit 
content and context until the interpreter’s expectations of relevance are satisfied 
(or abandoned), so in both contexts only one - cheapest in terms of effort and 
securing positive cognitive effects - interpretation is recovered.
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In principle then, the context in which an utterance is processed, in the 
examples under discussion reduced to the co-text, plays a crucial role in the 
comprehension process. This becomes even more obvious when a slight ma­
nipulation of context, as in (lc) below, diametrically changes the interpretation 
accessed as optimally relevant in a given discourse situation. So a minor mod­
ification of (la) resulting in (lc) will bring forth the body part reading, and 
not the box reading of the word chest, even though the verb open appears in 
the co-text. This happens because the body part reading will be primed in the 
context of assumptions about opening the human chest for operation or autopsy 
purposes made highly available by co-text in (lc):
( 1 ) (c)... I looked at the chest... “Let’s open it,” I said. “We need to find out what 
his lungs are like.”
A psycholinguistic experiment might reveal if in a context neutral situation, 
(lc) would be interpreted as a garden-path utterance, but it is not my concern 
here. Sperber and Wilson and other relevance researchers have carefully ana­
lyzed garden-path utterances (cf., among others, Merino Ferrada 2002; Solska 
2008). The originators of the theory suggest that “the outcome of the normal 
disambiguation procedure is not automatically accepted as the right proposi­
tional form. It is rejected if it fails to satisfy [the criterion of consistency with 
the principle of relevance]” (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 184). So disambiguation 
hypotheses, just like any other interpretive hypotheses recovered in the course 
of processing discourse, are formulated only tentatively and will be abandoned 
if discovered not to be optimally relevant.
However, as Wilson and Sperber (2007) emphasize, communication takes 
place at a risk, so misunderstandings are only to be expected. A viable theory of 
verbal communication needs to be able to account for what happens when there 
is a mismatch between the speaker intended meaning and the actual meaning 
recovered by the hearer. Communicative situations that involve disambiguation 
may potentially give rise to misunderstandings. In what follows, I would like to 
succinctly present how relevance accounts for miscommunication phenomena.
Another attested example with will be analyzed briefly. This time it is an 
utterance from a film, Shrek. Leaving aside the intricacies of film dialogue 
interpretation, which have to do with multiple embedding and assigning the 
film audience the role of well-informed overhearers (Bubel 2008), let us look 
at the nature of the misinterpretation that Shrek, the film’s protagonist, falls 
victim of. Just after the Donkey leams that the cursed Princess changes into 
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a lady-ogre at sunset, he and Fiona talk about her sad plight. In the course of 
this conversation Fiona utters (2):
(2) (a) ‘Princess’ and ‘Ugly’ don’t go together.
(b) That’s why I can’t stay here with Shrek.
What she means, which is manifest to both the immediate addressee, the 
Donkey, and the film audience is that the words princess and ugly can hardly 
function in the same context: princesses are supposed to be anything but ugly. 
Fiona’s utterance in (2) is overheard by Shrek, who knowing nothing about the 
curse, takes ugly to be the word that Fiona uses to refer to him. As a result, 
he interprets (2) as communicating the explicature: Fiona asserts that Princess 
and ugly Shrek do not go together, and providing direct explanation why she 
cannot possibly stay with Shrek, which she makes explicit in (2b). This is 
the first relevant interpretation of (2a) that is accessible to Shrek hearing by 
accident what Fiona has said to the Donkey.
The interpretation process as taking place in Shrek’s mind can be schemati­
cally represented as in Table 1.1 Thus interpreting (2a) involves fist embedding 
the decoded logical form of the sentence uttered into a description of the 
speaker’s overt behaviour, which with reference to (2a) has to do with identi­
fying that Fiona has made an assertion. Since ostensive stimuli are invariably 
presumed to be optimally relevant, Shrek takes it for granted that the utterance 
is relevant as a comment on what Fiona thinks about Shrek: this is the most 
immediate context that he has. The most accessible background assumption that 
while processing (2a) surfaces in Shrek’s mind is the implicated premise (d) If 
Fiona asserts that Princess and ugly Shrek do not go together then Fiona thinks 
Fiona and Shrek are a poor match. Processing explicature (e) FIONA; HAS 
ASSRETED THAT FIONA, AND UGLY SHREK DO NOT GO TOGETHER 
in the context of (d) leads to recovering the implicated conclusion (f) Fiona 
thinks that Fiona and Shrek are a poor match. Formulating this implicature may 
give rise to further assumptions that the interpreter may be ready to make, e.g. 
that he should not cherish any hopes about Fiona (as listed in (g) in Table 1).
1 Inevitably, this kind of analysis suffers from some inadequacy. On the one hand, there is 
arbitrariness, which as the authors of relevance point out (Wilson and Sperber 2002: 609), is due to 
the fact that the reasoning process has been spelt out here in English sentences, whereas interpretive 
hypotheses will most probably be represented (if they reach a level of mental symbolization) in the 
language of thought rather than in any natural language (cf. also Sperber and Wilson 1997). On the 
other hand, all these enrichments and adjustments happen simultaneously and not linearly, unlike 
what Table 1 presents.
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Table 1. Wilson and Sperber’s (2004: 616, cf. also 2002) schematic utterance 
interpretation model applied to (2a).
(a) Fiona has said, ‘Princess and ugly 
don’t go together.’
The encoded (incomplete) logical form of 
Fiona s utterance gets embedded into a 
description of Fiona s overt intentional 
behaviour.
(b) Fiona’s utterance is optimally 
relevant.
The presumption of relevance conveyed 
by any stimulus produced in overt 
intentional communication (here: Fiona s 
verbal behaviour) results in creating this 
wxpectation.
(c) Fiona’s utterance will achieve 
relevance as an assertion about what she 
thinks of Shrek.
Expectation raised by (b) and the fact 
that such an utterance would be most 
relevant to Shrek, who believes Fiona and 
Donkey are talking about him.
(d) If Fiona asserts that Princess and ugly 
Shrek do not go together then Fiona 
thinks Fiona and Shrek are a poor match.
First assumption to be accessible to 
Shrek which, together with other 
adequate premises, might satisfy 
expectation (c). Treated as an implicit 
premise of Fiona's utterance.
(e) FIONAi HAS ASSRETED THAT 
FIONAi AND UGLY SHREK DO NOT 
GO TOGETHER.
First pragmatic enrichment of the logical 
form of (2a) to have been made by Shrek, 
which together with premise (d) will lead 
to the satisfaction of (c). Treated as 
explicature of Fiona's utterance.
(f) Fiona thinks that Fiona and Shrek are 
a poor match.
Inferred from (d) and (e), meeting 
expectation (c); accepted as an implicit 
conclusion of Fiona’s utterance (2a).
(g) Shrek should not cherish any hopes 
about Fiona.
Inference from (f) and background 
knowledge. One of several potential weak 
implicatures of Fiona s utterance, which 
together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).
Yet a different interpretation is intended by Fiona addressing the Donkey 
in this scene. How does the intended addressee interpret Fiona’s utterance? 
Table 2 presents the interpretation process in a schematic way.
The major difference in how the interpretation proceeds here has to do 
with the fact that the Donkey’s expectations of relevance in the immediate
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Table 2. A schematic relevance theoretic utterance interpretation model applied 
to (2b) (modelled on Wilson and Sperber 2004: 616).
(a) Fiona has said, ‘Princess’ and ‘ugly’ 
don’t go together.’
The encoded (incomplete) logical form of 
Fionas utterance gets embedded into 
a description of Fiona s overt intentional 
behaviour.
(b) Fiona’s utterance is optimally 
relevant.
The presumption of relevance conveyed 
by any stimulus produced in overt 
intentional communication (here: Fiona's 
verbal behaviour) results in creating this 
expectation.
(c) Fiona’s utterance will achieve 
relevance as an explanation about how 
Fiona feels.
Expectation raised by (b) and the fact 
that this kind of assertion would be most 
relevant in the context of the conversation 
about Fiona’s plight.
(d) If Fiona asserts that Princess and ugly 
do not go together then Fiona thinks 
Princesses are not supposed to be ugly.
First assumption to be accessible to the 
Donkey which, together with other 
adequate premises satisfies expectation 
(c). Treated as an implicit premise of 
Fiona s utterance.
(e) FIONA; HAS ASSRETED THAT 
THE WORD ‘PRINCESS’ AND THE 
WORD ‘UGLY’ DO NOT GO 
TOGETHER*.
First pragmatic enrichment of the logical 
form of (2b) to have been made by the 
Donkey which together with premise (d) 
will lead to the satisfaction of (c). Treated 
as explicature of Fiona’s utterance.
(f) Fiona thinks Princesses are not 
supposed to be ugly.
Inferred from (d) and (e), meeting 
expectation (c); accepted as an implicit 
conclusion of Fiona s utterance (2b).
(g) Fiona will be ready to do everything 
to undo the spell.
Inference from (f ) and background 
knowledge. One of several potential weak 
implicatures of Fiona s utterance, which 
together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).
communicative context are related to explaining how Fiona feels about turning 
into an ugly ogress after the sunset every evening. So (2b) is optimally relevant 
as an assertion about how she feels. The implicated premise (d) If Fiona asserts 
that Princess and ugly do not go together then Fiona thinks Princesses are 
not supposed to be ugly processed together with the explicature FIONA; HAS 
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ASSRETED THAT THE WORD ‘PRINCESS’ AND THE WORD ‘UGLY’ 
DO NOT GO TOGETHER (as in (e)) leads to the recovery of the implicated 
conclusion, as spelt out in (f). Again the relevance theoretic model predicts 
that the interpreter may form further inferences, such as (g), but it will be done 
on his own responsibility.
Thus relevance theory can account for two alternative interpretations: one 
intended by the speaker and the other resulting from processing her utterance 
in the context different from the one the speaker has expected to be the first 
accessible one. The analyses provided are supposed to illustrate how relevance 
explicates the intricacies of verbal comprehension and in particular how it 
accounts for disambiguation.
Concluding remarks
Relevance theory, rooted in some observations about how human cognition 
works, is a model of overt intentional communication. It postulates the existence 
of the cognitive economy principles, defined as the Cognitive and Communica­
tive Principles of Relevance, which underlie the process of communicating and 
interpreting messages. Even though verbal comprehension starts with decod­
ing, it is inferential through and through: the comprehender necessarily needs 
to enrich the decoded logical form and infer the intended meaning, which is 
assumed to happen though the relevance oriented automatic processing.
The analytic tools developed within this framework have been applied to 
elucidate a vast range of diverse linguistic phenomena, embracing figurative 
language (cf. Pilkington 2000), language acquisition (cf. Bezuidenhout and 
Sroda 1998), and second language development (Paiva and Foster-Cohen 2004). 
Thus the principles and procedures described above and applied in order to 
explain how individuals interpret messages and disambiguate utterances have 
proved useful to account for other complex communication phenomena. What 
is more, the major claims of relevance theory have been verified in empirical 
studies and their psycholinguistic plausibility has been supported by evidence 
(cf. Gibbs and Bryant (2008); Noveck 2001; van der Henst and Sperber 2004; 
van der Henst et al. 2002). Unfortunately, the very thought processes that lie at 
the heart of relevance theoretic analyses are notoriously difficult to explore. As 
it has been indicated above, the speculative nature of assumptions formed as part 
and parcel of verbal processing is a vulnerable aspect of relevance machinery.
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